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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH ST ATE ROAD 
C01\1MISSION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12,478 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to 
determine the meaning and effect of section 208.03 of 
the Utah Department of Highway Standard Specifica-
tions for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue, 
March, 1968. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT 
Following trial without a jury, the court entered 
a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
trial court affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant entered into a contract with responder 
for construction of an Inter-State highv,'ay located i 
Salt Lake County, Utah, designated as No. 1-415-9(23: 
305 between 4500 South and Interstate 80. During t~ 
construction phase of the project, a question was raise 
by appellant as to payment for back-fill under sectio 
208.03 of the Utah Department of Highways Standar 
Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Ir 
terim Issue, March, 1968, which states: 
"JV1ethod of Measurement: 'Compaction' sha 
be measured by the cubic yard. The quantit 
shall be the volume of the 'Roadway Excavation 
'Structural Excavation,' and 'Borrow', placed o 
the roadway embankment measured in its origirn 
position, less the amount paid for backfill. N 
payment will be made for material not compactec 
such as waste, material used for surcharges, c 
initial layer over soft ground placed for a workin 
platform for equipment. For compaction throug 
cuts, or the natural ground under embankment 
the quantity shall be the product of the compacte 
area, and a compacted depth of 8 inches. 
Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard < 
material in final position in excavated area c 
embankment adjacent to a structure limited c 
follows: 
On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, paJ 
ments shall be limited to the area bounded b 
vertical planes one foot outside the footings t 
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the height of the material placed adjacent to the 
structure. No payment shall be made for mater-
ial placed above the elevation of the top of box 
culverts or other buried structures except pipe. 
On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to 
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside 
pipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter 
over the top of the pipe, limited to two feet." 
(Emphasis added.) (Ex 2-P) 
The term "backfill" as it is used in the context of 
this case, describes the process of placing and compact-
ing soil around a pipe which may vary in size. This 
procedure was explained by the contractor as follows: 
Q. Will you tell us just what is involved in a 
typical backfill operation by way of labor and equip-
ment; just the way a backfilling operation would pro-
ceed? 
A. Well, normally, the backfill in and around the 
pipe itself has to be done by hand;; that is, the men 
using hand tools of various types. Usually with hand 
tools, they have to place the material down underneath 
the pipes and around the sides. Other men working 
with compaction tools, be they gas tools or gasoline 
driven tools, are used to compact this, to consolidate 
the material so that the trenches won't settle and the 
pipe remains in its proper position. This is a require-
ment, and this procedure is followed until such time as 
the backfill is over the top of the pipe to a sufficient 
height to where it will support the use of heavier tools 
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or pieces of equipment that might finish this procedurr 
on up to the top of the trench. ( TR-14) 
The pipes installed by the contractor met the speci-
fications as to procedure and result. The dispute be. 
tween the parties arose over payment of backfill as 
prescribed in the above specification. The exhibits in-
troduced at trial show that appellant and respondent 
agree as to the outside dimensions of the pay area pre· 
scribed by the above specification. (Ex 16-P, 15-P, 
17-0) 
The dispute concerns whether or not the volume 
displaced by the pipe should be deducted from the 
volume of the outside dimensions of the pay area. 
The constractor was asked: 
Q. And as I understand your testimony, the only 
dispute that we have before the Court today is whether 
or not the volume of the pipe is to be deducted or in· 
eluded in the computation for backfill? 
A. That's correct. (R-94, Tr-37) 
The position of defendant was expressed by Mr. 
Stewart Knowlton, the resident engineer on the project 
(R-97, Tr-40) that contractor was to be paid for "ma· 
terial in final position" or "embankment adjacent to a 
structure" limited on pipes by the outside dimensions of 
the specification and that inasmuch as there is no back· 
fill material inside the pipe, payment was made by 
deducting the volume of the pipe and paying for ma· 
-
s 
terial in final position within the specified area (R-107, 
Tr-50 . . . R-108, Tr-51) Contractor claims that th1~ 
volume of the pipe should be included in payment for 
backfill. 
The position of the defendant has uniformly been 
the same that payments to contractors under the speci-
fication for backfill have been made with a deduction 
for the volume of the pipe. ( R-123, Tr-66) 
The respondent basically agrees with appellants 
statement of fact but submits that the issue despite ap-
pellant's excursions into state of mind and specification 
history is the same; namely, can defendant pay con-
tractor pursuant to section 208.03 for a volume circum-
scribed by the pipe which contains no backfill material? 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The court did not err in finding that the specifica-
tions of the contract relating to measurement of backfill 
were not ambiguous. 
The court found that section 208.03 of the Interim 
Standard Specifications of March 1968, "are not am-
miguous and were correctly interpreted by deefndant by 
measuring the outside dimensions of the planes described 
in 208.03 and deducting therefrom the volume displaced 
by the pipe thereby paying only for the actual material 
in final position as required by the specification". 
Respondent submits that a review of section 208.03 
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in accordance with proper statutory interpretation sup-
ports the above finding of the court. The provision must 
be considered as a whole with a critical inspection of 
what parts of the provision limit other parts. 
The applicable part of section 208.03 dealing with 
backfill states: 
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard of 
material in final position in excavated area or 
embankment adjacent to a structure limited as 
follows:" 
The statement includes all possible situations in 
which backfill can be measured and requires that in 
those circumstances involving backfill that measurement 
be made for backfill material in final position or em· 
bankment adjacent to a structure. It is clear that the 
structure being backfilled is not included in the payment 
for backfill because the measurement is only for backfill 
material in final position or embankment adjacent to 
the structure. It should be noted that the structure or 
in this case the pipe itself, is paid for under a unit bid 
item for pipe. (See Sec. 514.11 Method of Measurement 
and Sec. 514.12 Basis of Payment Ex 2-P p. 164) (See 
also Sec. 515.06 and 515.07 Ex 2-P p. 165). 
Thus, in the general situation the specification 
makes the condition that backfill be paid for material 
in final position or embankment adjacent to the struc· 
ture both of which are phrases which describe the back· 
fill material. Respondent submits that this excludes pay· 
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ment for backfill for other than material in final position. 
The provision states that the payment for backfill 
is limited to certain dimensions which are described. 
The provision first describes the limitations for footings, 
abutments, piers, box culverts wherein payment is lim-
ited to an area bounded by vertical planes one foot out-
side the footings extending to the height of the structure 
except for pipes. The general provision that payment 
be made for backfill material in final position adjacent 
to a structure is thus limited to the area described ex-
cept for pipes. 
Obviously the reason pipes must be limited separ-
ately is because they have a different configuration than 
the above mentioned structures which are generally rec-
tangular with vertical walls. 
On pipes the specification requires that the backfill 
material in final position adjacent to the structure be 
limited to vertical planes one foot or either side of the 
outside diameter of the pipe but unlike the rectangular 
type structures previously discussed, allows for payment 
above the top of the pipe limited to one half the diam-
eter of the pipe not to exceed two feet. Thus, the 
material in final position forms a collar around the pipe 
whereas the backfill adjacent to a vertical wall forms 
a parallel plane. The condition that measurement be 
for backfill material in final place adjacent to a struc-
ture varies only in the shape of the payment area which 
forms a collar around the pipe because it is round rather 
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than a box shape area adjacent to a vertical wall as in 
the case of abutments and piers. 
Each paragraph subsequent to the definition of 
of measurement for backfill material further limits thP 
definition to fit the definition to the differently shaped 
structures. The limitations do not change the require-
ment that backfill be paid for material in final position 
or embankment adjacent to a structure. Certainly a 
collar of material around the pipe is adjacent to the 
structure in the same manner as material next to a wall 
bounded by planes one foot vertical is adjacent to an 
abutment or pier, which are also structures. 
A structure as defined in section 101.5 7 of Interim 
Standard Specifications, March 1968, includes pipes in 
the following items: "Bridges, culverts, catch basins, drop 
inlets, retaining walls, curbing, manholes, endwalls, build-
ings, sewers, service pipes, underdrains, foundation drains, 
and other features which may be required in the work 
and not otherwise classed herein." Pipes are included in 
the major classification of structures in the Interim Spec· 
ifications (see Ex 2-P p. 113). 
A pipe being classed as a structure and separate 
payment being made for the pipe itself it is submitted 
that the requirement that backfill, which is the only item 
being discussed in this law suit, is for material in final 
postion and embankment adjacent to the pipe which 
means around the pipe. There is obviously no material 
inside the pipe and for that reason the respondent made 
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no payment for the volume of the pipe which respondent 
submits is a correct interpretation and that to interpret 
otherwise' would violate the clear and unambiguous m-
tent of the provision. 
The general rules of contract interpretation con-
cerning the words and phrases used is well stated in 
17 Am] ur 2nd, Contracts, Section 24 7, Page 63 7 where-
in it states: 
"Words used in a contract will be given their 
ordinary meaning where nothing appears to show 
that they were used in a different sense or have 
a technical meaning, and where no unreasonable 
or absurd consequences will result from doing so. 
Words chosen by the contracting parties should 
not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary 
meaning or given a curious, hidden sense which 
nothing but the exigency of a hard case or the 
ingenuity of a trained and accute mind can bring 
forth. In slightly different language, the rule 
may be said to be that the non-technical terms 
of every written instrument are to be understood 
in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless 
they have generally, in respect of the subject mat-
ter, as by the knowledge or useage of trade or the 
light, acquired a particular sense distinct from the 
popular sense of the same words, or unless the 
context evidentally points out that in the particu-
lar instance or in order to effectuate the immed-
iate intention of the parties, it should be under-
stood in some other peculiar sense." 
The law requires that the above specification sec-
10 
tion 208.03 be given a reasonable interpretation. R1 
statement of contracts section 235 states: 
"Words are to be taken and understood in the1 
natural, usual, and ordinary sense if they are clea 
an cl free from ambiguity." 
It is submitted that taken as a whole, the specifi 
cation as found by the trial court was not ambiguous 01 
the ground that payment could be made only for ma 
terial in final position or embankment adjacent to th1 
structure. It is a simple calculation to measure the out 
side dimensions of the backfill pay area and deduct th1 
volume of pipe. Respondent submits that to pay fol 
other than material in final position, which would b( 
the effect of paying for the volume of the pipe, doe! 
violence to the above rules of law which require thal 
words are to be taken and understood in their natural, 
usual, and ordinary sense. The words "backfill,'' "mater· 
ial in final position" and "embankment adjacent to a 
structure," and "structure" are all words and phrases 
which are capable of reasonable interpretation free from 
ambiguity. By what stretch of the imagination can the 
space occupied by the volume of the pipe be construed 
or interpreted as material in final position or embank· 
ment adjacent to a structure? That the above contractual 
rules of law are applicable to construction contracts, it is 
well stated in 13 AmJur 2d, Building and Construction 
Contracts, Section 8 Page 11, wherein it states: 
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"The principles of law governing the construction 
of contracts generally are applicable to building 
and construction contracts. Affect must be given 
to the intention of the parties as gathered from 
a consideration of the entire contract. The con-
tract should receive a practical construction by 
the courts . . . Building contracts and accom-
panying specifications are, the same as other doc-
uments, to be construed according to their terms, 
and that the terms of the contract are clear and 
unambiguous, the court is bound to enforce the 
contract as it finds it. The terms of a plain, un-
ambiguous contract cannot be varied or contra-
dicted by parole or extrinsic evidence or by evi-
dence of custom and useage." 
Appellant argues that the court must take into 
account a number of extrinsic facts and circumstances, 
including the situation of the parties, the apparent pur-
pose of the contract, and their prior contracting exper-
ience. All of the extrinsic matters which were presented 
to the court were allowed into evidence over the objec-
tion of respondent's counsel that such excursions were 
irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent. However, the 
trial judge allowed all testimony into evidence presented 
by the contractor and considered those matters brought 
out in the testimony. The rule on parole or extrinsic 
evidence is stated in 13 AmJur 2d, Section 124, Page 
114 wherein it states: 
"In accordance with the established principles 
governing written instruments generally, parole 
13 
one half the pipe diameter over the top of the 
pipe, limited to two feet." 
Respondent submits that even paraphrased, the 
provision found in appellant's brief as paraphrased, re-
quires payment for material in final position in the 
excavated area. It is the requirement that payment be 
made for material that makes the contract unambiguous 
and clear in its meaning. Payment can only be made for 
material and not for something which is not backfill 
material. The inside of a pipe is not backfill material. 
The very purpose of the pipe is to provide a duct or 
opening through which water can drain across the 
roadway. 
Counsel cites the case of Orren v. Phoenix Insur-
ance Co., 179 Northwest 2d, 166(Minn. 1970), which 
involved a case to recover for jewelry theft under a 
comprehensive home owner's policy issued by the de-
fendant. The court held that the homeowner's policy 
which provided that in any one loss from theft, the in-
sured should not be liable, "for more than $250.00 on 
articles of jewelry, including watches, necklaces, brace-
lets, gems, precious or semi-precious stones, and articles 
of gold or platinum ... ", was ambiguous since it neither 
clearly provided that insured should receive up to $250.00 
for each article of jewelry stolen, nor clearly provided 
that insured should not receive more than $250.00 in 
the aggregate for all articles of jewelry stolen; accord-
ingly, it would be construed in favor of the insured to 
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evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict 
the plain and unambiguous terms of a buildino . ~ 
or construction contract, nor can such terms be 
varied or contradicted by evidence of custom or 
useage. If, however, the terms of the contract are , 
uncertain or ambiguous, parole, or extrinsic evi- i 
dence is admissible to explain or interpret the 
contract language, such as, for example, parole 
evidence of customer useage to show the mean-
ing in which particular terms were used, or to 
identify and apply the terms of the writing to 
the subject matter. 
The fact that the judge allowed all of the extrinsic 
evidence into evidence makes appellant's argument as to 
extrinsic evidence a hollow one in that all of the facton 
mentioned were considered by the judge and the ruling 
made in favor of the defendant that the contract was 
not ambiguous, and that the backfill should be paid for 
material in final position, with the volume of the pipe 
deducted. 1 
To illustrate the problem of the construction placed i 
upon the specification found beginning on page 15 of 
appellant's brief, the appellant submitted that the pro· 
vision for measurement of backfill could reasonably be 
paraphrased to read: 
1 
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard I 
in final position in excavated area ... limited as I 
follows . . . on pipes, measurement may not ex· 
ceed a rectangle formed by vertical planes two I 
feet wider than the outside pipe diameter and 
15 
and clear on its face. The court after an examination 
of all the facts specifically found that the interpretation 
of the defendant-respondent was a correct interpreta-
tion, and that the volume of the pipe should be de-
ducted. 
It is a black letter rule of law that the findings of 
judgment of the trial court are presumed to be correct 
and valid and the reviewing court is to view the evi-
dence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the findings. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 U2d 422, 
37 P2d 762, ( 1962), Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu 17 U2d 
125, 405 Pd 346, ( 1965) Citizens Casualty Co., of New 
York v. Hackett 17 U2d 304, 410 P2d 767. (1966) 
Beehive Security Company v. Bush 16 U2d 328, 400 
P2cl, 506. ( 1965) 
As stated in the Hackett Case, supra, 
"In conformity with the cardinal rules of review 
which we have had occasion to affirm in prior 
cases, it is our duty to indulge the presumption 
that the findings and judgment of the trial comi 
are correct; and to affirm unless the appellant 
sustains the burden, which is his, of demonstrat-
ing to the contrary." 
The cardinal rules of review are outlined in Charl-
ton v. Hackett 11 U2d 389, 359 P2 1060 ( 1961), as 
follows: 
"In considering the attack on the findings and 
judgment of the trial court, it is our duty to fol-
low these cardinal rules of review; to indulge 
14 
provide that the insureds should receive for each stoler 
article, either its value or $250.00 whichever was less 
The court in that case was involved with a specific 
provision which the trial court found was ambiguous 
The court allowed evidence of a subsequent polic
1 
change in the language. 
The court in the present case based on the Orren 
v. Phoenix Insurance Co. case, allowed evidence that 
the wording in the specification had been changed b) 
the commission. Counsel states on page 18 that thil 
means that the fact that the contract provision wa1 
amended by the commission shows that the commission 
thought it was ambiguous. The court after considering 
this argument, rejected it and found that the contract 
provision was not ambiguous knowing full well that the 
provision had been changed. The trial judge had aU 
information before it over counsel's objection as to 
what changes were made and why they were made 
and found after taking into consideration all of the 
evidence which was placed before him that the con· 
tract was not ambiguous. 
II 
The court did not err in finding that defendant's 
interpretation of the contract provision was correct and 
in not adopting plaintiff's interpretation. 
In response to part 2 of appellant's argument, res· 
pondent submits that the contractor's interpretation of 
the contractual provision was not reasonable in that 
the contract provision was not ambiguous and was plain 
16 
them a presumption of validity and correctness· 
I 
to require the appellant to sustain the burden of 
showing error; to review the record in the light 
most favorable to them; and not to disturb them 
if they find substantial support in the evidence.'' 
It is submitted that the trial court used proper rules 
of contract interpretation and considered all of the evi· 
dence placed before it by the defendant and plaintiff. 
As stated in Maw v. Noble 10 U2d 440, 354 P2 121 
( 1960): 
"We are in agreement with the well recognized 
rule urged by def cndants that where there is un· 
certainty or ambiguity, the contract should be 
strictly construed against him who draws it. But 
it is to be kept in mind that this rule applies only 
where there is some genuine lack of certainty and 
not to the strained or merely fanciful or wishful 
interpretations that may be indulged in. The 
primary and more fundamental rule is that the 
contract must be looked at realistically in the 
light of the circumstances under which it was 
entered into, and if the intent of the parties can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty it must 
be given effect." 
As stated in Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk 
7 U2d 163, 321 P2d 221. ( 1958): 
"Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor 
the court has any right to ignore or modify con· 
ditions which are clearly expressed merely be· 
cause it may subject one of the parties to hard· 
17 
ship, but they must be enforced in accordance 
with the intention manifehted by the language 
used by the parties to the contract. (citing 
cases)" 
The finding and judgment of the court after all 
evidence had been presented was that the provision rela-
tive to backfill was not ambiguous and required the 
State Road Commission to pay for backfill material by 
the cubic yard of material in final position, or embank-
ment adjacent to a structure which material the court 
found does not include the valume of the pipe which 
contains no backfill material and that the State Road 
Commission was correct in deducting the valume of the 
pipe. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the trial court was correct 
in its finding and judgment and prays this court affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
ectfullv submitted, 
D~ong£~ 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
